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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1128 
___________ 
 
BRIAN MCDANIEL, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BRENDA COLLINS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-03944) 
District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 23, 2015 
 
Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 25, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Brian McDaniel, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the 
District Court’s order dismissing his amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we will affirm.  
I. 
 In October 2011, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”) 
notified McDaniel that his driving privileges would be suspended on November 9, 2011, 
because he did not pay the fines from two traffic violations.  The notice informed 
McDaniel that he could challenge the suspension by filing an appeal with the Court of 
Common Pleas.  See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1550(a) (providing that any person whose 
driver’s license has been suspended “shall have the right to appeal to the court vested 
with jurisdiction of such appeals”); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 933(a)(1)(ii) (providing 
that the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction over such appeals).  McDaniel did not 
appeal because he was already challenging the underlying violations in state court.  He 
did, however, take steps to alert PennDOT about his pending case.  As a result, PennDOT 
delayed the suspension until May 9, 2012.  See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1555(a) (“Upon 
receiving certification that a person has filed a timely appeal from a criminal conviction 
that has caused the department to issue a notice of suspension . . . , the department may 
delay commencement of the suspension . . . for a period of up to six months.”). 
 In November 2011, the Pennsylvania Superior Court overturned one of 
McDaniel’s underlying violations and affirmed the other.  McDaniel continued to litigate 
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the matter by seeking review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  In the interim, his 
license suspension went into effect as scheduled.  Although PennDOT sent McDaniel a 
letter stating that the suspension was delayed only until May 9, 2012, McDaniel contends 
that he did not learn that the suspension had gone into effect until he was stopped by the 
police on July 21, 2012.  The police charged McDaniel with driving with a suspended 
license and impounded his vehicle.  To reinstate his driving privileges, McDaniel paid the 
fines and associated penalties and fees for both of the earlier traffic violations, even 
though the Superior Court had overturned one of them.1 
 In 2014, McDaniel brought this action against Brenda Collins, a PennDOT 
employee allegedly responsible for his driver’s license suspension.  He alleged that 
Collins violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and committed 
state law torts.  The District Court dismissed McDaniel’s original complaint without 
prejudice for failure to state a claim and granted him leave to amend.  McDaniel then 
filed an amended complaint, in which he added a claim that Collins violated his right to a 
full and fair trial under the Sixth Amendment.  Collins then filed a motion to dismiss the 
amended complaint.  The District Court granted that motion, dismissing McDaniel’s 
constitutional claims with prejudice and his state law claims without prejudice to his 
ability to file them in state court.  McDaniel timely appealed. 
                                              
1 McDaniel then faced another suspension for the July 2012 traffic violation, but this 
second suspension never took effect because he was ultimately found not guilty of that 
violation. 
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of the District 
Court’s order dismissing McDaniel’s amended complaint is plenary.  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  That is, McDaniel’s “[f]actual 
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” to avoid 
dismissal.  Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.  Because McDaniel is proceeding pro se, we 
construe his pleadings liberally.  See United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3d Cir. 
1999).  We may affirm the District Court’s judgment on any basis supported by the 
record.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 The District Court did not err in dismissing McDaniel’s claim that Collins violated 
his procedural due process rights by suspending his license.  “In order to state a claim for 
failure to provide due process, a plaintiff must have taken advantage of the processes that 
are available to him or her, unless those processes are unavailable or patently 
inadequate.”  Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).  McDaniel did not 
utilize the available process—a civil statutory appeal pursuant to § 1550—and he does 
not argue that this process was unavailable or inadequate.  Nor did McDaniel utilize his 
other option:  requesting further delay of the suspension until his traffic case concluded.  
See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1555(b) (“A person may obtain an additional six-month delay if 
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the person obtains and forwards to the department an additional certification from the 
court that the appeal is still pending before the court.”).  Accordingly, McDaniel fails to 
state a procedural due process claim. 
 McDaniel’s argues that the license suspension should have been stayed pending 
the resolution of his traffic case.  For authority, he relies on Pennsylvania Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 1037(F)(2), which provides that the execution of a sentence in a 
traffic court case is stayed pending an appeal to the Superior Court.  This argument fails 
because the license suspension was not part of his sentence for the traffic violations; it 
was a related civil proceeding with its own mechanism for postponing the suspension—a 
delay pursuant to section 1555.  Cf. Plowman v. Commonwealth, 635 A.2d 124, 127-28 
(Pa. 1993) (holding that license suspension following drug conviction was not a criminal 
penalty but “merely a civil consequence of a criminal violation”).  This argument thus 
does not undermine the conclusion that McDaniel’s procedural due process claim fails.2 
 McDaniel’s Sixth Amendment claim is similarly flawed.  The Sixth Amendment 
applies only to criminal prosecutions.  See U.S. Const. amend VI.  McDaniel argues that 
his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he faced a criminal penalty—his 
license suspension—before the completion of his traffic court case.  This argument is 
unavailing because that suspension was not a criminal penalty; rather, it was a civil 
                                              
2 McDaniel also raises vague arguments that Collins violated his substantive due process 
rights.  Because he does not allege any conduct that shocks the conscience or any facts to 
support his claim that his fundamental rights were infringed, he fails to state a substantive 
due process claim.  See Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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consequence of the underlying criminal violations.  See Ploof v. Commonwealth, 590 
A.2d 1318, 1321 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).  Collins administered a civil sanction, which 
McDaniel chose not to challenge by the proper means, not a criminal penalty.  Therefore, 
McDaniel fails to state a Sixth Amendment claim. 
 Because further amendment of McDaniel’s constitutional claims would have been 
futile, the District Court properly dismissed them with prejudice.  See Fletcher-Harlee 
Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).  With no 
remaining constitutional or other federal claims, the District Court acted well within its 
discretion when it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over McDaniel’s state 
law claims.  See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009).   
III. 
  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
